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Abstract
In a dataset of weekly observations over the period since 1990, the discount on UK
closed-end mutual funds is shown to be nonstationary, but reverting to a nonzero
long run mean. Although the long run discount could be explained by factors like
management expenses etc., its short run uctuations are harder to reconcile with an
arbitrage-free equilibrium. In time series terms, there is evidence of long memory in
discounts consistent with a bounded random walk. This conclusion is supported by
explicit nonlinearity tests, and by results which suggest the behaviour of the discount
is perhaps best represented by one of the class of Smooth-Transition Autoregressive
(STAR) models.
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1 Introduction
On the whole, anomalies in nancial markets tend to melt like snowakes almost as
soon as they are examined closely. The phenomenon of the discount on closed-end
mutual funds is di¤erent in this respect, as well as a number of others. After decades
of published academic work on the UK and US markets, discounts show little sign
of shrinking, and in fact at the time of writing this paper, still average more than
11% in the UK. This is true in spite of the fact that no entirely rational explanation
for the mispricing has ever been found, while all the obvious explanations have been
eliminated. Among the factors which have been adduced as possible explanations have
been management expenses and holdings of illiquid or unquoted securities (Ingersoll
(1976), Malkiel (1977) for USA, Draper and Paudyal (1991) for UK), tax liabilities
on unrealised capital gains2 (Malkiel (1977), (1995)) and, as far as country funds are
concerned, asymmetric information (Frankel and Schmukler (2000)). Most of these
would-be explanations have since been discredited, or at least shown to be no longer
relevant.3 However, in an important recent contribution to this debate, Gemmill and
Thomas (2002) (henceforth G-T) rationalise the long run level of the discount in
terms of the cost of arbitrage, though even they are unable to explain its short run
deviations without relying on the idea of noise traders motivated by market sentiment,
2Note that in the UK no tax is levied on the capital gains made by closed-end mutual funds.
3For a survey of the literature, see Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999).
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thus conrming the views originally put forward by DeLong, Schleifer, Summers and
Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Schleifer and Thaler (1991).4
Rather than seeking directly to explain the apparent anomaly in pricing behav-
iour, this paper approaches the problem from a di¤erent angle, instead revisiting the
problem of modelling the underlying time series processes for evidence consistent or
inconsistent with the explanations o¤ered in the literature. Thus, starting from an
acceptance that the long run discount must be nonzero in the overwhelming major-
ity of cases, as is obvious from a cursory examination of the data as well as from
the published literature, we look for statistical evidence of mean-reversion generated
by arbitrage subject to bounds determined by transaction costs. In particular, this
paper takes account of the fact that the costs of trading may well vary across dif-
ferent classes of investor. If this is the case, the further the discount wanders from
its steady state level, the greater the potential volume of arbitrage trade, as more
and more investors are o¤ered capital gains in excess of their costs. In econometric
terms, the implication is that mean reversion will be stronger the further the discount
strays from its long run level, a mechanism modelled explicitly by Smooth Transition
AutoRegressive processes.
The data analysed relate to UK closed-end funds (Investment Trust companies
4This paper is exclusively concerned with the discount in the secondary market. No attention
is given to the well-known anomaly in the pricing of initial public o¤erings of investment trust
companies (e.g. Levis and Thomas (1995)).
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or ITCs), which make up a larger and more diverse market sector than their equiv-
alent in the USA,5 the subject of most of the published research. Previous time
series analysis of this market established that price and net asset value (NAV) were
cointegrated, but that the cointegrating vector was probably not (1, -1) and that
the discount tended to follow a distinct characteristic pattern over the life of a fund
(Chen, Copeland, OHanlon (1994)).6 This paper rst conrms that, while price and
NAV are both I(1) variables, the discount is in most cases nonstationary, at least once
we allow for the possibility of noninteger orders of integration. In fact, estimation of
ARFIMA models suggests that for most ITCs the discount tends to be nonstation-
ary, but mean-reverting around a level of about 15%. As a proximate explanation
of this behaviour, it is shown by simulation that these results are consistent with a
random walk within the bounds estimated by G-T by direct methods i.e by comput-
ing actual costs of arbitrage. Finally, evidence is produced to demonstrate that ITC
discounts adjust to shocks in a nonlinear fashion, and estimates are computed for the
smooth-transition autoregressive (STAR) class of models which have been shown to
provide an adequate representation of the time series characteristics of a number of
other nancial variables, including exchange rates and index futures. As far as ITC
discounts are concerned, it is found that in over half the cases the symmetric ES-
5The value of the total assets of the UK ITC sector is about £ 40bn. G-T cite gures to show
that in the 1990s there were more than 3 times as many closed-end funds in the UK as in the USA
6See also Bleaney (2004).
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TAR model provides a better description of discount behaviour than the asymmetric
LSTAR .
The rst section of the paper introduces the dataset and its properties. The
following section considers the stationarity properties of the time series for price,
NAV and the discount. Estimates of the fractional root d are discussed in Section 3,
and an interpretation is o¤ered in the next section. The paper ends in Section 5 with
estimates of nonlinear adjustment processes consistent with the results presented in
preceding sections.
Throughout the paper, the variables of interest will be the logs of price and net
asset value, p = ln(P) and v = ln(V), so that the premium is dened as q = log P 
log V.7 The text here follows market convention and much of the published literature
in dealing with the discount (i.e. the negative of the premium, -q), but all data in
the tables is given in terms of the premium, so that smaller (more negative) numbers
imply a greater discount.
7In the UK market, the premium is dened as (P-V)/V, the practice followed by G-T among
others. This may be less problematic for cross-section work, but it has drawbacks in a time series
context. For example, while it is possible to test the premium dened in this way for stationarity, it
creates a problem interpreting tests for cointegration between P and V. Also, using the log denition,
the change in the discount can be straightforwardly decomposed into the price return and net asset
value return.
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2 The Dataset
The dataset used in this paper is taken from Datstream, and consists of weekly
Wednesday market-closing prices for closed end mutual funds, known in the London
market as investment trust companies (ITCs). In most cases, the data start at
05/05/90 and end 12/05/04, a total of 735 observations, but the dataset includes
a number of funds which ceased trading before the end of the period, though none
provided fewer than 500 observations. Out of the gure of 300 quoted by G-T as the
number of closed-end equity funds listed in London at some point in the 1990s, 133
are included in the present study. 8 The oldest and largest funds in the industry are
included, in particular the venerable Foreign and Colonial founded in 1868 and with a
current NAV of over £ 2bn, but also a substantial proportion of smaller and/or newer
funds, though none launched later than mid-1989.9 As far as investment portfolios
are concerned, the ITCs invest overwhelmingly in ordinary shares, though some
have small holdings in other assets, notably preference shares, bonds, real estate etc.
Geographically, no attempt has been made to distinguish between funds investing in
8In fact, the sample consisted of more or less all the funds covered by Datastream and trading
at the start of the period in 1990, excepting only a handful which failed to survive for the minimum
500 weeks. This compares with the G-T dataset of 158 companies observed over the years 1992-7.
9The median size of fund in the sample was approaching £ 200m in terms of NAV, with about
10% over £ 1bn and approximately the same proportion below £ 100m.
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UK and those investing in other parts of the world.10
The salient facts about the dataset can be seen in Table 1, which documents
clearly what is perhaps the most remarkable fact about the UK closed end mutual
fund market: the sheer pervasiveness of the discount. Far from being a temporary
aberration, the discount is a more or less permanent feature of the ITC market. In
a sample of 133 observed over 735 weeks, the typical (i.e. median) ITC traded at a
mean discount to net asset value of 13%, ranging from a maximum premium of only
a little over 5% to a maximum discount of 30%. Moreover, the discount was highly
variable, with a typical standard deviation over the period of 7.2%.11 The asymmetry
is striking, insofar as every single ITC share went to a discount at least once during
the period, but more than a quarter of companies never once traded at a premium
to NAV, and in fact only four out of 133 traded at a premium on average over the 15
years.12
10By default (i.e. unless they specically commit to investing in a single country or region) British
funds usually diversify internationally. In that respect, the industry could be said to regard the UK
as simply another national market, so that ITCs restricted to investing in the UK are e¤ectively
treated as country funds. Whether or not the same country fund paradox is observed in the UK ITC
sector as in the USA (see e.g. Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) or Levy-Yeyati and Ubide (2000)) is
a question not pursued here.
11Not surprisingly, Agyei-Ampomah and Davies (2005) report nding excess volatility in a similar
dataset.
12Even though these are weekly data, there were a number of zero returns for some of the smaller
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In summary, the dataset here displays the same basic characteristics which have
become familiar from the large literature on USA and UK closed-end funds published
in the last twenty years, with little or no evidence that the well-established anomalies
are being eliminated with the passage of time.
3 Arbitrage Bounds and the Long Run Discount
This persistence is remarkable, given that the largest ITCs are extremely liquid, and
that the situation is well known to researchers in both the academic and practitioner
communities. In order to carry the analysis further, the approach taken here involves
breaking down the phenomenon into two components: the long run equilibrium level
of the discount, and the short run uctuations around that level.
A number of papers address aspects of the market situation which could justify the
existence of a long run discount. One of the more convincing arguments in this regard
is that the computation of NAV overstates the present value on which shareholders
have a claim, insofar as there is a continual leakage of value into costs, whether in
the form of management charges or in more general agency costs. On the other hand,
this is to some extent o¤set by the fact that ITCs typically pay dividends, albeit in
most cases at a lower level than the average dividend yield on stocks in general. If
we make the assumption that both of these items are a constant proportion of NAV
stocks, probably reecting thin trade and consequently stale prices.
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(which is not completely unrealistic in this context), then it is straightforward to
show (see Ross (2002)) that the equilibrium price implies a long run discount given
by the ratio:13
 q = 
+ yP
(1)
where  is the management/agency cost as a proportion of NAV, and yP is the
dividend yield paid by the ITC. In practice, most of the components of the long run
equilibrium given in (1) are unobservable. For example, although explicit manage-
ment fees are usually xed in advance, other cost factors (e.g. nominee account fees)
are more variable, both over time and possibly across investors. More importantly,
the expected dividend yield is uncertain. Nonetheless, Ross (2002) and G-T o¤er
back-of-the-envelope estimates of this equilibrium discount for the USA and UK re-
spectively, arriving in both cases at a gure in the 10% to 15% range, which is broadly
consistent with their datasets and with the results given in Table 1, as well as with
the results of formal time series analysis, as will be shown in the next two sections.
If arbitrage were costless, arbitrageurs might have been expected to prevent any
persistent deviation from this long run equilibrium. However, as G-T make clear,
there are nonnegligible costs to the types of transactions required to exploit mispricing
13The approximation is due to the fact that the Ross (2002) presentation has been translated into
logs, for consistency with the denition of the premium used in the rest of this paper.
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in this market (see also Ponti¤ (1996)). For example, in the most common scenario,
the underpricing could be exploited in a number of ways, most simply by buying the
underpriced ITC stock while simultaneously shorting the underlying portfolio. This
transaction undertaken at time 0 would yield an expected prot of:
E(T ) =  q0 + T [(rL   rB)  (yV   yP )] (2)
where T is the time period over which the arbitrage position has to be maintained,
rL and rB are lending and borrowing rates respectively, and yV , yP are dividend
yields on the underlying portfolio and the ITC stock respectively.14 The term in
square brackets will almost invariably be negative, since borrowing rates are usually
greater than lending rates,15 and the dividend yield on ITC stock is in most cases
lower than on the market as a whole. It follows that, when an ITC is underpriced, the
elimination of arbitrage opportunities requires that the expected change in discount
be greater in absolute terms than the net cost of carrying the position for T periods.
There are a number of obstacles to implementing this arbitrage strategy, however.
In the rst place, it may not always be possible and may be extremely costly to
14This is more or less the same equation as in G-T, translated here into continuous time to be
consistent with the denition of the premium in terms of logs.
15This actually understates the case, since the e¤ective lending rate is likely to be further reduced
in practice, because the proceeds of short sales are not normally made fully available to the seller.
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take a short position in the ITC portfolio, though of course it is likely to be easier
the more closely the portfolio mirrors one of the market indices, especially if a liquid
futures contract is available to provide cheap replication. In general, replication will
be cheaper the closer the beta of the ITC portfolio to one.
Perhaps the most obvious and in practice most important problem is that the
length of time, T, over which the arbitrage position will need to be held is ex ante
unknown. In theory, a perfect capital market will only price this uncertainty insofar
as it covaries with the market return, a possibility which will be discussed later.
In reality, with default risk and de facto limits on lines of credit often imposed on
arbitrageurs by their own institutions, it is likely to be a serious obstacle. This is
especially so as the arbitrageur entering the market at time 0 cannot be sure that
the discount will not actually widen at any point in time t, 0 < t < T.16
4 Stationarity
16Note the comparison with a (rational) bubble, in which the price is above its equilibrium level, as
dened by the fundamentals, but short-selling is never protable until the ultimate collapse, because
the price carries on rising at an exponential rate su¢ cient to compensate speculators for the risk that
the bubble may burst during their holding period. Of course, we cannot invoke the same mechanism
here, since ITC prices are in most cases below their equilibrium levels, and a rational bubble cannot
be negative, because the price itself cannot fall below zero. (Diba and Grossman (1988)).
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Given that discounts are apparently nonzero, both in the short and long run, one
might at least expect price and NAV to be cointegrated, so that the discount adjusts
over time to the unknown (and unobservable) equilibrium value given in (1). In
other words, it might reasonably be argued that price and net asset value can hardly
diverge without limit. Shocks to the discount ought to be reversed eventually, so
that, invoking the Granger-Engle Theorem, the price would adjust to the previous
periods discount along the path implied by the error correction mechanism towards
its long run level.
On the face of it, this approach looks unpromising in the present context, given the
asymmetry between discounts and premia observed in this dataset. In fact, this pes-
simism is clearly justied, as can be seen from Table 2, which summarises the results
of standard Kwiatkowski et al (1992) tests of the stationarity null, alongside Phillips-
Perron (1988) tests of the unit root null hypothesis. From the results presented here,
the conclusions with regard to price and NAV are unambiguous. Plainly, as antici-
pated, they are both I(1), since we can decisively reject stationarity of p=log(P), v=
log(NAV) in levels, whereas we have no reason to reject the null that p and v are
I(0).
In contrast, the results for the premium dened as q = (p v) are ambiguous.
On the one hand, the value of the KPSS statistic overwhelmingly suggests rejection
of the I(0) null in almost every case. On the other hand, the Philllips-Perron test
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results indicate rejection of I(1) in the majority of cases. In fact, the median P-P
statistic of -3.5 falls just below the 1% rejection level for the I (1) null, and for most
ITCs we reject a unit root at the 5% level.
On the face of it, these results appear to be consistent with those reported by
Cheng, Copeland and OHanlon (1994), who looked for evidence of cointegration in a
broadly similar population of UK ITCs, albeit over an earlier period, and reached the
conclusion that the long run discount was plainly nonzero. However, for two related
reasons, the option of looking for cointegration between unit root variables is not
one pursued here. First, the standard approach of looking for cointegration between
price and NAV (as in Cheng, Copeland and OHanlon (1994)) is likely to yield an
estimate of the long run relationship involving not only a nonzero intercept but also
a slope coe¢ cient signicantly di¤erent from unity. While the former result is easy
to interpret (e.g. in terms of equation (1)), and in fact is entirely consistent with
the other results reported in this paper (and in G-T), the latter is far more di¢ cult
to understand. Even allowing for a nonzero steady-state discount, it is hard to see
why ITC stock prices should fail to respond one-for-one to changes in NAV in the
long run.17 Secondly, as already pointed out, the balance of the evidence suggests
17Cheng, Copeland and OHanlon (1994), working with logs of price and NAV, interpreted the
nonhomogeneity as reecting a life-cycle pattern in the discount, increasing at rst in the early years
following the otation of a fund and subsequently falling back as it matured.
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the discount is probably not an I(0) process in most cases, so that even if p and v
are cointegrated, the cointegrating vector is certainly not (1, -1).
5 Long Memory Tests
If we were to restrict ourselves to the two polar possibilities that discounts are either
I(0) or I (1), we would have to conclude that, not only are long run discounts nonzero,
they also show no tendency to settle at any particular level, and shocks to discounts
tend to persist indenitely, with no tendency to reversal as time passes. These are not,
however, the only two possibilities. One possible interpretation of the results in Table
2 is that discounts are actually long memory processes, in the fractional integration
sense of Granger and Joyeux (1980) i.e. that discounts contain a component for
which the degree of integration is neither 0 nor 1, so that they can be described as
I(d) processes for which 0 < d < 1. Following this line of approach, the obvious next
step would be to derive maximum likelihood estimates of the univariate ARFIMA
model:
(L)(1  L)dqt = a+ '(L)ut (3)
where ut  D(0; 2) is an error term which is assumed in most cases to follow a
Students t distribution, in order to allow for the fact that the data exhibit far fatter
tails than is consistent with Gaussian normality, (L); '(L) are polynomials in the
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lag operator, and the fractional di¤erence operator is dened by:
(1  L)d =
1X
j=0
bjL
j (4)
where the bi are given by:
b0 = 1 and for j  1 bj =  d (j   d)
 (1  d) (j + 1) =
j   d  1
j
bj 1 (5)
where  (x) is the gamma function of x.
It should be noted that, in this context, 0 < d < 0.5 implies stationarity, while
0.5 < d < 1 indicates nonstationarity, but mean reversion. The choice of model was
based on the Akaike Information Criterion, subject to the overriding requirement that
the residuals be nonautocorrelated, as evidenced by the Box-Pierce statistic.18
The results of tting the ARFIMA model to the ITCs in the dataset can be
summarised as follows:19
1. As anticipated, there was strong evidence that d > 0 in all but 5 cases.
Even if one took the failure of the numerical estimation process to converge as evi-
dence against long memory, we would still have had to conclude that d = 0 could be
rejected (at the 5% level) in at least 125 cases out of 134.
18In a few cases it proved impossible to nd an ARFIMA model (at least, of order (4,d,4) or
lower) su¢ cient to capture all of the autocorrelation in the residuals. There were also four cases of
nonconvergence. All models were estimated using James Davidsons TSM Version 4.05 software.
19Detailed results are available from the author.
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2. In about 20% of cases, it was impossible to reject a unit root i.e. d =1.
3. The median value of d = 0.75 indicated nonstationarity, but also mean rever-
sion.20
4. There were only 8 cases in which the estimated value of d < 0.5 was consistent
with stationarity.
5. For the typical ITC, the intercept estimate was -0.15, implying a long run dis-
count of 15%. At the same time, in about 25% of cases, the hypothesis that the true
value of the intercept is zero could not be rejected.
In general, the interpretation of these results is not straightforward. The impli-
cation is that discounts follow a long memory process, which is nonstationary but
mean-reverting, so that for the typical ITC, a shock has a half-life of at the very least
2 months, and in most cases far longer.21 Ultimately, disequilibrium is eliminated as
the discount returns to its long run level, which is most often not zero, however, as
would be implied by a naïve market e¢ ciency view.
In fact, the median 15% long run discount emerging from these ARFIMA esti-
20Davidson and Sibbertsen (2005) examined the long memory properties of 5 ITCs out of the
current dataset, using a new test involving log-periodogram regressions. Their conclusions were
broadly supportive of the "nonstationary but mean reverting" characterisation of the time series
processes, as originally stated in the rst draft of this paper.
21It is impossible to be more specic since, although estimated values of d are clustered in the 0.5
to 0.8 region, there is wide variation in the ARMA components for di¤erent ITCs.
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mates is quite close to the G-T estimate of 12.0%, as the required compensation for
cost loading on ITC portfolios along the lines set out in equation (1). Broadly, the
results given here support their view that we actually have two puzzles in need of an
explanation. First, why is there a nonzero long run discount? Second, why do distur-
bances to the discount persist so long? Having rationalised a nonzero discount with
reference to expense ratios etc, how can one further explain a readjustment process
in the aftermath of a shock as protracted as is implied by the results given here?
The long memory results are only partly consistent with the scenario of an arbi-
trage cost-determined bound within which the ITC price may uctuate in response
to random shocks caused by day-to-day imbalances between purchases and sales. In-
stead, they appear on the face of it to suggest that prices are certainly not conned
to these arbitrage bounds, and that when random shocks occur, the reversal takes
many weeks and in some (unit root) cases is never expected to happen.
However, the key to a reconciliation may lie in noting two points. First, by
considering additional factors over and above the arbitrage costs taken into account
in equation (2), G-T ultimately derive a sequence of ever wider channels within which
they claim that discounts are conned in the long run. The time series evidence
reported here can be reconciled with their analysis in the context of a model of a
bounded random walk, the long memory implications of which can be demonstrated
by a simple simulation exercise.
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In a possible time series representation of the G-T scenario, let us take net asset
value as exogenously xed at any moment, and suppose that, given this level of NAV,
the maximum and minimum possible price of the ITC share is determined by factors
which are only partly observable: arbitrage costs, management fees, open-ending
costs etc. Now if, within these limits, the price (and hence the discount) uctuates
randomly under the impact of shocks to net demand, the outcome could be a bounded
random walk process:
qt = qt 1 + "t if q < qt 1 < q
qt = qt 1 otherwise
(6)
where q,q are lower and upper bounds on the discount respectively, and "t is a zero-
mean IID series. This process is a random walk until it hits either the upper or lower
bound.
As already noted, if there are bounds in the present case, they are not directly ob-
servable. What then would be the outcome of taking a standard time series approach
to modelling this series i.e. of ignoring the bounds and treating it as an unbounded
process?
Figure 1 shows the results of an experiment involving tting a fractional di¤erence
process to a series generated by the random walk (6), subject to successively wider
bounds. The shocks "t are 1000 drawings from the standard normal distribution at
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each bound, where the bounds are measured in terms of standard deviations on the
horizontal axis. Experiments with non-Gaussian shocks generated results that were
qualitatively similar, and, in the relevant region, extremely close numerically to those
given here.
As can be seen, the resulting estimates are biased downward along a smooth curve,
so that the narrower the bound, the lower the estimated value. So, for example, a
random walk between bounds of one standard deviation in either direction would
mimic an autoregressive process with a coe¢ cient of 0.61 or a fractional di¤erence
process with root d = 0.49. Viewed in this light, the median estimate of d = 0.75
quoted earlier is consistent with bounds set at approximately two and a quarter
standard deviations either side of the mean, or just under +/-18% in the median
case.22 Interestingly, this is quite close to the 35% range of variation in the discount
which was estimated by G-T by the totally di¤erent approach of aggregating the
di¤erent types of cost associated with arbitrage operations in this market.
6 The Adjustment Mechanism
The evidence given in the previous section is obviously not the end of the story. It
is merely suggestive of the possibility that the underlying ITC price process may
22Allowing for asymmetric bounds had minimal e¤ect, generating a central estimate of d = 0.78
at the level quoted in G-T (i.e. +5% to -30%, or +0.7 to -4.3 standard errors).
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be characterised by some form of nonlinearity generated by arbitrage limits or, con-
ceivably, by other factors as yet unknown. The nature of the nonlinearity is not
immediately obvious, but a hint can be found in G-Ts characterisation of ITC pric-
ing. In their words, the option of open-ending limits the discount, so that like a
spring under tension, the further it is pushed, the more strongly it recoils. (p. 2575).
While this picture could be consistent with a number of nonlinear adjustment
models, the most likely candidate seems to be the class of Smooth Threshold Au-
toRegression (STAR) models, which makes its appearance in the economics literature
in two forms, Exponential (ESTAR) and Logistic (LSTAR).
There are a number of reasons to entertain this class of models. First, the ES-
TAR model has been shown to provide an adequate representation of the adjustment
process for several nancial variables, notably the real exchange rate (e.g. Michael,
Nobay and Peel (1997), Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001)) and the basis in the index
futures market (Taylor (2003)). Secondly, in the present context it seems highly likely
that the bounds analysed in detail by G-T are binding on investors at di¤erent levels.
For example, even in the absence of capital market imperfections, the borrowing and
lending rates appearing in equation (2) are unlikely to be the same across agents
with heterogeneous credit ratings, access to capital and information. Moreover, un-
less expectations are completely homogeneous, estimates of the prospective dividend
yields are likely to vary across investors, as also are anticipations with respect to
21
the holding periods required, T. This is particularly true in cases where the payo¤
from arbitraging an underpriced ITC stock is dependent on open-ending, the timing
of which is likely to be especially hard to predict.23 Thirdly, given that arbitrage
involves the uncertainties in equations (1) and (2), among others, the return to ar-
bitrage will involve a risk premium, unless none of these factors covaries with the
market return, which seems improbable. For example, if, as seems highly likely, most
potential arbitrageurs have a nite maximum holding period, whether as a result of
credit market constraints or other factors, they will require compensation for the risk
of having to liquidate early. The risk associated with premature liquidation is clearly
related to the market as a whole, rst, because the higher the market, other things
being equal, the higher the ITC share price, and secondly because it is well known
that open-ending is more common in periods when the market is buoyant.
For all these reasons, we would expect that, the further the price from net asset
value (i.e. the greater the premium or discount to fair value), the higher the propor-
tion of investors who would view the reward to arbitrage as great enough to cover
the expense and associated risk. The argument can be seen as a generalization of the
well-known work by Yadav, Pope and Paudyal (1994), (1999) on the pricing of index
23One major reason for expecting costs to vary across arbitrageurs is that there are plainly cost
advantages available to the ITC management itself. Even if it is prevented from trading in its
own stock or has no cost advantage in doing so, it can open-end far more cheaply than an outside
arbitrageur, who must rst gain control of the ITC before being able to proceed.
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futures. Instead of a single market-wide threshhold, each potential arbitrageur has a
threshold determined by his/her transaction costs, borrowing and lending rates, as-
sessment of the probable holding-period horizon and likelihood of open-ending. Then
if we imagine the community of arbitrageurs arranged in ascending order of thresh-
old size, the greater the deviation of ITC price from net asset value, the larger the
number of traders for whom arbitrage is potentially protable, and hence the greater
the market pressure to reinstate equilibrium.
The ESTAR mechanism captures this e¤ect in what amounts to a three-regime
setting. In terms of the ITC premium, we postulate the following:
qt = 
0xt + 
0xt
h
1  e (qt d c)2
i
+ ut (7)
where xt is a vector of exogenous and/or predetermined variables, usually including
a constant,  and  are parameter vectors, and the critical adjustment function is in
square brackets. Stability requires that   0, with a zero value implying linearity.
At one extreme (the outer regime), the adjustment function has a maximum
value of one, when (qt d   c) ! 1 i.e. when the discount d periods back is a
long way above or below its long run equilibrium level, c (which may possibly be the
equilibrium described in (1)). The delay d could in principle take any value up to
the maximum order of lagged dependent variable in the xt vector. In practice, most
papers assume d = 1, in which case equation (7) reduces to a simple autoregression,
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possibly augmented by exogenous variables in xt:
qt = (
0 + 0)xt + ut (8)
In this limiting case, adjustment is at its most rapid, possibly instantaneous, if the
RHS above reduces to a random walk i.e. if the elements of  and  corresponding
to q t 1 sum to unity.
At the other extreme, as (qt d   c)! 0, the adjustment function tends to zero, so
that the inner regime (when the discount is in the neighbourhood of c) is characterized
by the alternative autoregression:
qt = 
0xt + ut (9)
In general, stability in the middle region requires   0, and we
anticipate a value for c signicantly di¤erent from zero, almost invariably negative,
with a conjecture that for most ITCs the long run value will not be far from the
unconditional mean given in Table 1. As in most of the published work on nancial
variables, xt is restricted to a constant24 and lagged values of the dependent variable
[1; qt 1; qt 2::::::::::], so that the equation actually estimated was:
qt = 0 +
mX
j=1
jqt j + e (qt d 0)
2
"
nX
j=1
j(qt j   0)
#
+ ut (10)
24A polynomial time trend might be justied, given the well-known tendency for discounts to vary
with the age of the ITC (Copeland, OHanlon and Cheng (1994)) but experiments with a trend were
largely unsuccessful. In any case, Paya and Peel (2003) cast doubt on the reliability of estimates of
ESTAR processes with trends.
24
As already mentioned, this model has been extensively applied to a number of eco-
nomics variables, most notably to real exchange rates. Its applicability in the present
context needs to be explored, but it is not the only candidate. Whereas asymmetric
adjustment in exchange rates seems a remote possibility, it certainly cannot be ruled
out a priori in the present context, since there are a number of elements to arbitrage
costs which may be di¤erent for buyers and sellers.
Consider again the two sides of the arbitrage involved here. On the one hand,
when price is above NAV, the arbitrageur seeks to short sell the ITC share while
simultaneously buying the underlying portfolio or a proxy, in the form of an index
futures contract, an ETF25 or maybe a (fairly priced) index fund. On the other hand,
when, as is usually the case, the price is at a discount to NAV, the arbitrageur has
to take a short position in the portfolio while buying the stock. Comparing the two
situations, it is not at all obvious that transaction costs, broadly dened, will be the
same. For example, if the portfolio is not a good match to the market so that the use
of proxies is ruled out, the costs involved in creating a short position are unlikely to
be the same as the costs of going long. Moreover, in the longer term open-ending a
mutual fund to eliminate a discount will cost more than simply issuing more shares
to exploit a premium.
The implication is that asymmetric adjustment is a possibility which needs at the
25ETFs are securities intended to track a specic (London) market index.
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very least to be entertained. The obvious alternative to ESTAR in this regard is the
LSTAR model, given by the following equation:
qt = 0 +
mX
j=1
jqt j +

1 + e (qt d 0)
 1 " nX
j=1
j(qt j   0)
#
+ ut (11)
This model di¤ers from ESTAR in allowing for three, rather than two regimes. Instead
of simply an inner and an outer regime, we now have an inner regime, and two outer
regimes depending on whether the premium is above or below its long run level.
Specically, in the neighbourhood of long run equilibrium, we have:
qt  0 +
mX
j=1
jqt j +
1
2
"
nX
j=1
j(qt j   0)
#
+ ut (12)
which is the autoregression dening the inner zone.
As far as the two outer regimes are concerned, note that we continue to assume
that   0: It follows that, in the upper regime, when qt 1   0 ! +1, we get:
qt  0 +
mX
j=1
jqt j +
"
nX
j=1
j(qt j   0)
#
+ ut (13)
On the other hand, in the lower regime when the premium is a long way below
its long run level i.e. when qt 1   0 !  1, the model reduces to:
qt ! 0 +
mX
j=1
jqt j + ut (14)
As far as model selection is concerned, Escribano and Jorda (1999) formulate a
straightforward series of LM-tests for nonlinearity in general, and subsequently to
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distinguish between ESTAR and LSTAR processes, which in the present case can be
based on the following equation:
qt = 0 + 1xt + 1xtqt 1 + 2xtq2t 1 + 3xtq
3
t 1 + 4xtq
4
t 1 + ut (15)
xt is the vector of pre-determined variables appearing in linear form, which means
here the lagged values of q t in the second term on the RHS of (7) and (8). The test
for nonlinearity involves the null hypothesis that all four i = 0 i = 1; 2; 3; 4: In
the same equation, the null hypothesis of no LSTAR (ESTAR) process is accepted
if we cannot reject the constraint 1 = 3 = 0 (2 = 4 = 0). The authors of the
testing procedure recommend choosing between LSTAR and ESTAR on the basis of
how decisive the rejection i.e selecting the model with the lowest p-value for the test
statistic on the constraint.
The outcome of applying these tests is given in the rst ve columns of Table 3.
In implementing the tests, the order of autoregression is selected by the AIC criterion
subject to a maximum of m = 6 and the longest delay entertained is likewise d = 6.
There are two noteworthy features of the test results. First, for 90% of the ITCs in
the sample, the tests reject linearity at the 10% level. Second, in about 60% of cases,
ESTAR is preferred to LSTAR. There is no obvious explanation of why some ITCs
appear to adjust symmetrically, others asymmetrically. In particular, there was no
signicant di¤erence between the estimates of the long run discount in the ESTAR
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and LSTAR groups.26
Actually tting ESTAR/LSTAR models involves dealing with a number of com-
plicating factors. In the rst place, discounts share some of the same characteristics
as other nancial variables, in particular a high degree of heteroscedasticity and non-
normality in the form of fat-tailed error distributions, so that all estimates are based
on t-distributed GARCH error processes. Secondly, the vagaries of numerical meth-
ods make it essential to explore the likelihood surface so as to avoid, if possible,
settling on a local rather than global optimum. To that end, the estimates given in
the table were generated from a sequence of starting values for the transition para-
meter, , so as to ensure as far as possible convergence to a global minimum of the
least squares function.27 In six cases, convergence proved impossible to achieve in
any case. The remainder produced a wide spread of parameter values, though mostly
high, indicating relatively rapid reaction to disequilibrium.28 Unfortunately, there is
26Note that, if we insisted on believing the long run discount to be zero, there would be a clear
presumption in favour of asymmetry, in the face of the clear bias towards discount rather than
premia. However, once we accept that the long run discount is not necessarily zero, there is no a
priori reason to prefer an asymmetric to a symmetric formulation of the adjustment process.
27The equilibrium deviation in the nonlinear component was normalised by the standard error
for estimation purposes. The coe¢ cients in the table have been adjusted to take account of the
normalisation.
28It is impossible to be more precise because, as is well known, the response of STAR models to
shocks cannot easily be derived analytically, especially when they are augmented by a GARCH-t
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no straightforward way of judging the signicance or otherwise of these estimates. In
fact, as van Dijk et al (2002) note:
"..the t-statistic [of ] does not have its customary asymptotic t-distribution under
the hypothesis that  = 0......[since] large changes in  have only a minor e¤ect on
the transition function, high accuracy in estimating  is not necessary."
Nonetheless, there are a number of noteworthy features of the results in Table
3. First, the intercept estimates are close both to the mean discount observed over
the sample period and to the tted values from the ARFIMA models. Second, the
estimates of  are spread over such a wide range that it can at least be said with
condence that adjustment speeds vary substantially across ITCs. However, closer
examination revealed no obvious pattern which might explain the di¤erent transition
speeds. As regards the adequacy of the tted model, it is doubtful whether much
reliance can be placed on the R2statistics in this case. Perhaps more relevant is the
fact that the residuals of the tted models appear nonautocorrelated for the most
part, with no sign of any remaining heteroscedasticity.
error process. Instead, simulation is required in order to generate what is known as the Generalised
Impulse Response Function.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has examined the time series properties of the discount rate on UK ITCs,
conrming the results of Cheng, Copeland and OHanlon (1994) and G-T that, if there
is cointegration between price and net asset value, it is not a relationship implying a
zero long run discount. In fact, the evidence presented here indicates a long memory
discount process implying in most cases nonstationarity with mean-reversion, a result
which could be the outcome of tting a linear model to any of a number of possible
nonlinear processes, for example a bounded random walk. A process of this kind
would be consistent both with the anecdotal evidence and also with the detailed
estimates of G-T. To make the mechanism explicit, nonlinearity tests were applied to
the discount process across a sample of 133 investment trust, resulting in rejection of
the null hypothesis of linearity in 90% of the dataset. Two types of smooth transition
autoregressive models were estimated, the symmetric ESTAR model dominating the
asymmetric LSTAR in 60% of cases.
These results open up a potentially rich research agenda. The most obvious
question is whether a similar mechanism is at work in other countries, especially the
USA, where there is a sizable closed-end mutual fund sector. Other issues discussed
in the published literature which could be investigated in the framework set out here
relate to the role played by interest rates and, more importantly, by market sentiment
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in a¤ecting ITC pricing, and vice versa.
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